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RECENT CASES
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co.1 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania be-
came the first appellate court in this jurisdiction to specifically recognize that
an invasion of one's right to privacy can constitute an actionable tort.
Plaintiff was one of several policemen whose picture had been taken with
a prisoner; evidently this picture created the impression that the plaintiff and
his fellow officers were beating their prisoner. This picture was published in
a newspaper, and nearly three years later, without the consent of the plaintiff,
this picture appeared in the defendant's magazine. Plaintiff brought an action
for the invasion of his right of privacy, basing his action on this publication.
The court held that such a tort did exist in Pennsylvania but decided that the
plaintiff could not recover, being barred by a two year statute of limitations.'
While this is the first time an appellate court has specifically held that
such a tort existed in Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth
came very close to so holding several times.
In 1937 our Supreme Court decided the case of Waring v. WDAS Broad-
casting Station, Inc.8 The plaintiff here sought to enjoin the broadcasting of
his recordings by the defendant radio station. The majority concerned itself
with the property rights of the plaintiff, but in a concurring opinion Justice
Maxey said:
"I think plaintiff's right which was invaded by the defendant was his right
of privacy, which is a broader right than a mere right of property. A man
may object to any invasion of his right to privacy or to its unlimited invasion."
In this opinion, the law review article by Warren and Brandeis,4 which
is credited with having created this tort, was cited as authority for the propo-
sition that an individual has the power to fix the limits of the publicity to be
given to his thoughts, sentiments and emotions so that he can therefore with-
draw them from all dissemination.
In 1954 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again was on the threshold of
recognizing the existence of a right of privacy. In the case of Schnabel v.
Meredith ' the defendant owned a newspaper and in connection with an article
1 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956).
2 Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 236, § 2, tit. 12, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. § 34.
3 327 Pa. 433, 194 At. 631 (1937).
4 The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.R. 193 (1890).
5 378 Pa. 609, 107 A.2d 860 (1954).
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on gambling pointed out that some months previously slot machines had been
discovered on the plaintiff's estate and that none had been located in the
county since that time. Plaintiff thereupon sued on the theory that he had
been libeled and his right of privacy invaded. The Court assumed that such
a right exists in Pennsylvania but did not so decide because it was of the opin-
ion that this article in the defendant's newspaper was of legitimate news
value and thus could not support this action.' It was felt that the plaintiff
had relinquished his right to privacy by his possession of the slot machines
despite the fact that six months had elapsed between the discovery and this
publication. The Court relied on the Restatement of Torts T to support its
conclusion:
". .. It is only where the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency
that liability accrues. These limits are exceeded where intimate details of
the life of one who has never manifasted a desire to have publicity are exposed
to the public. . . . A distinction can be made in favor of news items and
against advertising use.
Several Pennsylvania lower court decisions have recognized that an inva-
sion of one's right to privacy constitutes an actionable tort. In Harlow v.
Buno Co., Inc.' a picture of the plaintiff was used, without any authorization,
for advertising purposes. She thereupon brought an action on the theory that
her right to privacy had been invaded. The court stated that there was no
appellate decision recognizing this action in this jurisdiction and went on to
find that, in the absence of such a decision, such a tort was in existence here.
This tort, according to the opinion, is closely akin to one's personal liberty
and security and is thus derived from natural law.' This case, it seems, is in
complete agreement with the Restatement theory of making a distinction
against advertising use of a person's picture.'"
In Clayman v. Berstein " the same court that decided the Harlow 12 case
was again called on to decide whether or not to enjoin a doctor from develop-
ing or making any use whatsoever of pictures he had taken of the facial dis-
figurations of the plaintiff. The defendant doctor preliminarily objected,
claiming that one's right of privacy cannot be invaded in the absence of some
publication. These preliminary objections were dismissed on the ground that
6 Justice Jones said: "Assuming, without deciding, that such a right does exist in Pennsylvania,
the appellant has not brought himself within the operation of the rules governing the right of pri-
vacy where such right has been judicially recognized."
7 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 867, Comment (d).
8 36 D. & C. 101 (1939).
9 Judge Alessandroni said: "The true nature of the right, however, is one which is closely
akin to the rights of personal security and personal liberty and is derived from the natural law."
10 See note 7 supra.
11 38 D. & C. 543 (1940).
12 See note 8 supra.
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the plaintiff could not be expected to be constantly on guard against a possible
publication. The court pointed out that the wrong could be committed with-
out plaintiff's knowledge and that the damage would then be done; the pos-
sibility of such an event could cause mental distress and humiliation to the
plaintiff. The court here seemed to feel that the pictures should not even be
used in giving medical instruction. Judge Alessandroni, in referring to the
defendant's contention that this could be done, said:
"While the court appreciates the development of the art of photography
generally, and in the medical profession particularly, not only as a means of
diagnosis and treatment, but also as a means of instruction, its progress has not
yet reached a stage at which physicians have been accorded the right to photo-
graph their patients without their consent.
This viewpoint seems to be somewhat at variance with the frequently stated
theory that this right does not exist with respect to the dissemination of edu-
cational information.1"
Another lower court decision in Pennsylvania in 1950 also was concerned
with this tort. In Lisowski v. Jaskiewicz 11 the plaintiff charged the defendant
with false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, uttering of slanderous words
and civil conspiracy. The defendant filed a counterclaim for invasion of his
right of privacy by the plaintiff. This counterclaim was based on numerous
somewhat unneighborly tactics of the plaintiff which included calling the de-
fendant insulting names, shouting insults at him, pounding on a party wall
and sweeping dust in the defendant's yard. The plaintiff's preliminary ob-
jection to the counterclaim was sustained. In holding that the defendant had
failed to make out a cause of action, the court stated:
"Although Pennsylvania courts will recognize privacy as a personal right
and will give damages for its invasion the right will not be extended so that
it includes any annoyance a community dweller suffers." 35
Prior to the Hull " case the United States District Court for the eastern
district of Pennsylvania held, in Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co." that the
publication of an accident victim's picture in a magazine some twenty months
after the accident constituted an actionable invasion of the plaintiff's privacy.
The court pointed out, and the plaintiff agreed, that a publication in a news-
paper shortly after the plaintiff's misfortune would not have been the basis
of a recovery since it would then have been a matter of public interest and
of news value.
1377 C. J. S. 399, § 2, Right of Privacy (1952).
14 76 D. & C. 79 (1950).
15 Judge Crumlish was the author of this excellent opinion.
16 See note 1 supra.
17 192 F. 2d 974 (1951).
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The Superior Court, in the Hull " case, was not, it should be noted, en-
gaging in judicial legislation. The Uniform Single Publications Act,1" the
court pointed out, refers to invasion of privacy. It was therefore concluded
that while the legislature did not create such an action, it had recognized its
existence in the statute.
In conclusion, the courts of Pennsylvania have for some years agreed that
the invasion of one's privacy could constitute a tort. Lower courts have spe-
cifically recognized this in numerous cases and appellate court decisions indi-
cated that they would so hold when it became necessary, as in the Hull 20 case,
to do so.
FRANK S. SEIDERS, JR.
18 See note 1 supra.
19 Act of August 21, 1953, P.L. 1242, tit. 12, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. § 2090.1.
20 See note 1 supra.
ACCIDENT INSURANCE-CRIMINAL ACT-PROXIMATE CAUSE-
PUBLIC POLICY
The Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Taylor v. John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d. 230, 132 N.E.2d. 579 (1956), allowed re-
covery under a group insurance policy covering employees against "bodily
injuries sustained solely through external, violent and accidental means, di-
rectly or independently of all other causes" where the insured died while com-
mitting the crime of arson. This is apparently the first time that recovery
has been sought under an accident policy where the insured was involved in
an arson plot.
The insured with others plotted and prepared to burn a house in order
to recover the insurance thereon. The insured died when the fire started pre-
maturely while he was in the house recovering some articles for his own use.
The court held that it was the fire rather than the criminal act which caused
the death, and that the death was the result of an accident within the accident
policy.
The insurance carrier contended that the deceased was not only engaged
in an unlawful act but died through means which were wilful, voluntary, in-
tentional, and designedly employed by him in committing the crime of arson.
The whole act of preparing the fire and the subsequent igniting (apparently
by a pilot light on the stove) were a part of the same single happening.
The majority of the court accepted the beneficiary's argument that the
conditions which created the fire (spreading gasoline, and the presence of the
pilot light) were not the immediate cause of death. Preparing for the arson
created the condition, but the fire caused the death. And the fire was an acci-
dent in that it occurred before the deceased intended it to occur. The insured
was a criminal engaged in a criminal act but. not a suicide. He intended to
profit by his act, not to lose his life.
The dissenting opinion conceded that the insured did not intend to die.
However, it agreed with the insurer's contention that the act of re-entering
the house to get bedspreads was so inseparably connected with the arson plan
in conduct and timing that there was no occasion for discussion of proximate
cause. To this was added the further statement that to allow recovery would
be contrary to public policy under the Criminal Code.
A provision, such as the one in the Taylor policy requiring loss to be
caused by accident "independent of all other causes" is equivalent to a pro-
vision requiring it to be the proximate cause.' In negligence cases the proxi-
1 29 Am. JUR., Insurance § 932 (1940).
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mate cause of an injury is that cause which, in a natural and continuous se-
quence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred.' It has been held, however,
that the rules applicable to tort cases are not necessarily controlling in insur-
ance law,' and further, that the meaning of the word "accident" which should
be applied in accident insurance cases is the meaning applied in the common
speech of man.' Appleman" summarizes two general views of what an acci-
dent is: (1) if the insured performs a voluntary act the result of which, as a
reasonable man, he should have foreseen would naturally and probably re-
sult in injury to himself, his injury is not accidental;' and (2), the strict doc-
trine, that regardless of how unforeseeable the result is, if the circumstances
leading to injury are set in motion by the insured's own act, there can be no
recovery.'
Most of the accident insurance cases which have arrived at a result via
the argument of proximate cause have been decided where an injury or death
occurred to one inflicted with a pre-existing disease. Many of these cases have
held that death resulting from the combined effects of an accident and a pre-
existing disease aggravated thereby does not preclude recovery on an accident
policy8 if the disease, while existing, is but a condition and the accident is
the sole and proximate cause of the insured's death.' It is not material that
the pre-existing diseased condition contributed to the death where injury is
the primary cause."° For example, death from blood poisoning following
injury to a diabetic was aided and accelerated by the insured's condition. Never-
theless, recovery on the accident policy, similar to the one in the Taylor case,
was allowed." The physical condition of the insured in another case 12 set
the stage for injuries sustained when he slipped and fell. In this case the slip-
ping and not the physical condition was held to be the sole and efficient cause
of the injury. Many cases have held that the diseased condition or infirmity
of the insured merely set the stage, and that the injury was an efficient inter-
vening cause; thus the insured or his beneficiary has recovered.
This seems to be the reasoning followed in the Taylor case; namely, the
cause of an injury or death is that which actually produces it, while the occa-
2 38 AM. JUR., Negigence § 50 (1940).
3 Roeper v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 138 Pa. Super. 238, 11 A.2d 184 (1940).
4Lewis v. Ocean Acc. and Guaranty Corp., 224 N.Y. 18, 120 N.E. 56 (1918).
51 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 391 (1941).
6 Piotrowski v. Prudential Ins. Co., 141 Misc. 172, 252 N.Y.S. 313 (1931).
7Trau v. The Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 Pa. Super. 89 (1930).
8Rebenstorf v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 299 111. App. 71, 19 N.E.2d 420 (1939).
9 Foulkrod v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 343 Pa. 505, 23 A.2d 430 (1942).
'0 Union Life Ins. Co. v. Epperson, 221 Ark. 522, 254 S.W.2d 311 (1953).
"t Moyer v. Mutual Benefit Health and Acc. Ass'n., 94 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1938).
12 Kelly v. Pittsburgh Casualty Co., 256 Pa. 1, 100 At. 494 (1916).
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sion is that which provides an opportunity for the casual agencies to act. 3 The
fire is the cause; the preparation is the condition.
On the basis of the tort definition of proximate cause and the results of
the class of cases previously mentioned, the Taylor case stands with consider-
able support. It is not to be suggested, however, that all cases in the pre-
existing disease class have allowed recovery. Many courts have held that
where the pre-existing disease either causes or contributes in causing death there
can be no recovery under an accident policy." In these cases it was apparently
felt that the condition was the primary cause in spite of the intervening injury.
By this view it could be held that no recovery should be allowed in the Taylor
case on the ground that the deceased's preparation for the fire by spreading
gasoline around the house created a condition which very materially contrib-
uted to the disastrous results.
The insurer likened the principal case to the situation where a person
started a fight and received a broken leg in the affray." That person had cre-
ated a condition the result of which was natural and probable. But the Illinois
court in the Taylor case distinguished the latter situation from the principal
case by saying that the aggressor in a fight knows when he starts the fight that
he might be injured. Does this mean that the unknown risk involved in burn-
ing houses, because, of little common experience in these lines, should permit
the insured to recover for injuries or death resulting from such activity?
Very few "criminal act-accident insurance" cases have been decided with
specific reference to proximate cause. 6 The reason may be that the courts
here have steered clear of this concept, no definition of which can be alto-
gether clarifying or satisfactory since, inevitably, terms used in the definition
will themselves require definition,' and other means will reach desired re-
sults. While such courts speak in terms of "foreseeability", "natural and prob-
able consequences", and "reasonably anticipated", which are mere words and
possibly hazy concepts, it would seem from a long line of cases that this is an
approach which lends itself to the type of relief sought by the court on grounds
of public policy where the insured was engaged in a crime at the time of injury
or death. There is a distinction between voluntary engagement in crime where-
"s Phillabaum v. Lake Erie & W. Ry., 315 II. 131, 145 N.E. 806 (1924).
14 Muraskey v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n., 94 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1938); Rodia v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 354 Pa. 313, 47 A.2d 152 (1946); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Witt,
Ark. -, 260 S.W.2d 641 (1953).
"5Hutton v. States Acc. Ins., 267 Ill. 267, 108 N.E. 296 (1915).
16 See Szymanska v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 37 Del. 272, 183 At. 309 (1936), where in-
sured's conduct in paying improper attention to another's wife whose husband brought about insured's
death because of a fall down stairs was held a means contributing proximately to the result, and
hence death did not result from accidental means within the accident policy, as against contention
that insured's conduct furnished the occasion and not the cause of death,
17 38 Am. JURS. Negligence § 50 (1940).
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by the stage is set for injurious results and an involuntary disease condlition
of the insured. And it would seem that should the court desire on grounds
of public policy to deny relief to the criminal or his beneficiary, it might best
avoid talking in terms of an intervening cause.
Some courts have specifically stated that they will aid no man to take a
profit from the violation of a law. They hold that since a contract insuring
one against the risks of crime is void for reasons of public policy, then, a for-
tiori, for the same reasons one should not be permitted to recover under an
accident policy when he is injured or killed while engaging in crime." Other
courts have been equally specific in denying recovery because, otherwise, crime
would be encouraged by protecting the criminal from some of the consequences
which society imposes. 19
Of the remaining courts deciding cases in the criminal act-accident insur-
ance class, the majority have also denied recovery to the insured or his bene-
ficiary under accident policies similar to the one in the Taylor case. Their
reasons have been varied, and the following are a few examples. Insured,
engaged in robbery, was killed by the police; it was held that the results should
have been foreseen.2" Insured had left the scene of the crime of burglary while
an accomplice was resisting the police; his death was part of the res gestae."
Insured was killed during a robbery; he might have reasonably anticipated
such a result. 2 The insured was killed while resisting arrest; it was held that
it was no accident.' Insured was fleeing from the police after the act of bur-
glary; this result was natural and probable and should have been foreseen."
The discharge of a weapon when the insured was struggling for it was held
not to be unforeseeable, but rather the natural and probable consequence."
Examples of the contra minority view follow. Insured, attempting to flee
from a house after committing burglary, was killed by the discharge of his own
gun; the burglary was held not the cause of the death. 6  Insured attacked
another person; after losing his gun in the struggle he withdrew, and then
was shot; it was held that insured had no reason to expect a deadly defense. 27
18 Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Pa. Super. 353 (1904).
9 Piotrowski v. Prudential Ins. Co., 141 Misc. 172, 252 N.Y.S. 313 (1931) (killed coin,
nitting a felony); Rousseau v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 91, 11 N.E.2d 921 (1937)
(auto theft; insured killed in wreck as he was fleeing); DeMello v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 281 Mass. 190, 183 N.E. 255 (1932) (violation of the prohibition laws; insured injured).
20 Price v. Business Mens' Assur. Co., 188 Ark. 637, 67 S.W.2d 186 (1934).
21 Eagan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 295, 128 S.W.2d 1085 (1939).
22 McGuire v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 164 Tenn. 32, 46 S.W.2d 53 (1932).
2 Bernard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 134 Neb. 402, 278 N.W. 846 (1938).
24Griffin Adm'r. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 61 York Legal Record 128 (Pa. Common
Pleas, 1947).
2 Koester v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 36 Del. 537, 179 Ad. 327 (1934).
26 Jordan v. Logia Suprema De La Alianza Hispano Americana, 23 Ariz. 584, 206 Pac. 162
(1922).
.7J rb v. Commercial Mut. Acq, Co., 232 Pa, 215, 81 Atd. 207 (1911).
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Of course, in reference to the matter of public policy, it may be desirable
to allow the beneficiary to recover on the criminal's insurance policy rather
than to have the possibly innocent beneficiary suffer for the misdeeds of the
insured. While this idea might have motivated the court in the Taylor case,
there is nothing in the opinion to so indicate.
Apparently, Illinois will continue in the same vein with other cases of the
same general nature in the future. Since the Taylor decision, another bene-
ficiary collected on an accident policy like the one in the principal case.28 There
the insured was killed while recklessly driving his automobile at an excessively
high rate of speed. If the insurance companies want to guard with certainty
against the type of situation described in the principal case, it appears that it
will be necessary to specifically qualify the terms of the policy with a "viola-
tion of law" clause.
In summary, there is an abundance of authority for holding, as did the
Taylor decision, that an act may furnish the occasion for another act and that
the second act may be the cause of the injury without the first act in any manner
being a contributing cause of the injury. The second act may be the result
of some intervening cause in no manner flowing from the original act, but
this cause is given an opportunity to operate through the occasion furnished
by the original act.29 While this approach is one commonly employed in pre-
existing disease cases, even their recovery is not always allowed. In the class
of cases herein called criminal act-accident insurance, the majority of courts
have either expressly refused recovery on grounds of public policy or have used
terminology omitting the idea of an intervening cause and have achieved the
same result of no recovery.
JOHN S. KOOKOGEY.
28Rodgers v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., - I1. - , 132 N.E.2d 692 (1956).
29 Phillabaum v. Lake Erie & W. Ry., 315 Ill. 131, 145 N.E. 806 (1924).
195$7.1
